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Abstract: This paper investigates whether political pressure from incumbent 
presidents influences the Fed’s monetary policy during the period that Alan Greenspan 
was the chairman of the United States Federal Reserve Board. A modified Taylor rule 
- featuring the inflation rate and the unemployment gap rather than the output gap - 
with time-varying coefficients will be used to test well-known political-economic 
theories of Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1987). This novel approach addresses some of 
the disadvantages of Ordinary Least Squares, and has the additional benefit of 
allowing the use of mixed frequency data. Our findings suggest that the Fed under 
Greenspan did not create election driven monetary cycles, but was less inflation avers 
with a Democratic president.  
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1.      Introduction 
 
In the recent years, economists and policy makers have shown interest in independent 
central banks and their monetary policy, and a number of countries increased the legal 
independence of their central banks. There are several reasons for the trend towards 
more independence of central banks since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
system. Especially the success of the independent Bundesbank led to the belief that 
independence of the central bank is a useful devise to maintain price stability. 
Furthermore, the Maastricht Treaty requires that having an independent central bank is 
a condition for entering the Economic and Monetary Union. Also for former socialist 
countries an independent central bank is a good start for a well-functioning market 
economy.  
 Central bank independence seems beneficial in the long run. However, policy 
makers could have other objectives. Kiewiet and Rivers (1984) find a relationship 
between the actual economic performance of a country and upcoming elections. The 
authors claim that voters are more likely to support the incumbent party when the 
economic situation is more favorable. Consequently, politicians might try to influence 
the behavior of the central bank.  
 In this paper we focus on the period in which the Fed was chaired by Greenspan. 
In this period some authors argue that Greenspan, and also other central bankers, 
departed from a strict or rules-based monetary policy rule because of favourable or 
less favourable economic circumstances. For instance Cargill and O’Driscoll (2012) 
argues that interest rates lower than predicted by the Taylor rule contributed to the run-
up of real estate prices, the burst of the US bubble economy and subsequent 
international financial crisis in late 2008 and early 2009. Also more recently central 
banks are not free of political pressure, because to resolve the global financial crisis 
pressure increased on central banks to shift to an activist policy to support fiscal 
imbalances and prop up troubled financial institutions. 
 This paper investigates whether political pressure from the incumbent has had an 
effect on monetary policy in the United States in the period August 1987 until and 
including January 2006. Cargill and O’Driscoll (2013) concludes that Fed’s emphasis 
on the short run inevitably subjects them to political pressure. We develop a modified 
Taylor rule and test the two main theoretical findings of political influence on 
macroeconomic policy from Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1987) which will be 
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reviewed in the next section. We present the econometric model of the Taylor rule in 
Section 3. In this section we also discuss how we test our hypothesis related to 
political pressure. The data is presented in Section 4. Section 5 discussed our results. 
In Section 6 we test whether there is political pressure on the Fed. We complete the 
paper with our main conclusion in Section 7.  
 
2.      Literature review 
 
The time inconsistency, or dynamic inconsistency, problem is the main theoretical 
driver for central bank independence. Time inconsistency in economics occurs when a 
present plan is optimal for a future period but is actually suboptimal when the future 
period starts. The most prominent models, based on game theory, of the dynamic 
inconsistency approach are from Kydland and Prescott (1997) and Barro and Gordon 
(1983). Their conclusion is almost universally that the dynamic inconsistency problem 
leads to a bias towards higher inflation. As a result Rogoff (1985) concludes that the 
central bank’s objective function should reflect stronger inflation aversion than the 
objective function of the society. In other words, society is better off by appointing a 
conservative central banker that has a different objective function then the social 
welfare function. This makes central bank independence theoretically a preferred 
option. Note however that there is a discussion what central bank independence is, and 
whether it is a necessary condition for price stability. Taylor (2013) concludes that 
formal independence without policy rules does not generate good 
policy outcomes. We refer to Hayo and Hefeker (2002) for a critical review of the 
literature.  
The literature on time inconsistency and central bank independence focuses on 
price stability as a prerequisite for growth. However, the relationship between inflation 
and economic growth is complex, but most economists agree that inflation negatively 
influences economic growth due to for instance uncertainty in the markets, menu costs 
and disinflation costs. This is supported by early empirical research of Fischer (1993) 
and Barro (1998). Alesina and Summer (1993), Grilli et al. (1991), and Cukierman et 
al. (1992) conclude that central bank independence is negatively correlated with 
inflation. For a survey of we refer to Temple (2000). Although these results suggest 
that central bank independence has positive effects on real economic performance, the 
empirical results are not clear-cut. Both Alesina and Summers (1993) and Cukierman 
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et al. (1993) do not find any relationship between real economic variables and legal 
central bank independence.  
We focus in this paper on political pressure on monetary and fiscal authorities. 
Barro and Gordon (1983) argue that when monetary rules are in place, every period 
the policy maker is tempted to cheat on the monetary rules in order to benefit from 
inflation shocks. A politician wants to engage in monetary policy and fiscal policy in 
order to satisfy his own or his constituents’ preferences instead of choosing the 
optimal solution for society. One of the possible arguments for choosing a suboptimal 
solution is mentioned by Nordhaus (1975), who argues that politicians only care about 
staying in the office. The main supporting assumption of his model is that voters are 
not forward looking and do not have any memory and therefore can be systematically 
fooled. Nordhaus’ (1975) model led to the creation of a political business cycle (PBC), 
where the incumbent reduces unemployment before the elections by stimulating the 
economy and will fight inflation right after the economy by causing a recession. 
Although the outcomes of this model became quite famous, the main critique is based 
on the assumption that voters are not rational. However, by including rational voters 
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988) arrived at similar 
conclusions. In Rogoff and Sibert (1988) the incomplete information of voters on the 
competence of policy makers caused the cycle, while in Cukierman and Meltzer 
(1986) policymakers and voters have different information about shocks. However, in 
many econometric studies on PCB’s such as Alesina et al. (1997) and Faust and Irons 
(1999) there is little support for increasing economic activity prior to elections in the 
United States. 
 There is also a different view on why politicians would like to deviate from the 
optimal solution. Hibbs (1987) argues that there are ideological differences between 
parties and this will lead to partisan politics creation partisan macroeconomic cycles. 
For the United States, his main assumption was that Democratic voters are poor and 
laborers, while the Republican voters are rich and capitalists. In addition, he claims 
that expansionary fiscal and monetary policy will lead to income redistribution from 
the rich to the poor. Therefore, Hibbs concludes that the Democrats would be more 
tolerant to higher inflation rates, while the Republicans would be more inflation 
averse. Alesina (1987) models the partisan approach of Hibbs (1987) in a rational 
world, where elections create uncertainty because the rational economic agents do not 
know which party will win. As a result, this model predicts only differences at the 
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beginning of the term in office of the new party. In the case of the United States, it 
predicts that if the Republicans win the election there will be low money growth and a 
recession while economic growth and high money growth will be observed when the 
Democrats win the election. Alesina and Sachs (1988) empirically confirm the 
findings of Alesina (1987).  
 Most empirical research about the PBC and the partisan approach have focused 
on both monetary as fiscal policy. However, the fiscal authority is shared between the 
incumbent and the congress in the United States and the president has little influence 
in the congress. As a result, it is difficult for the president to manipulate the economy 
with fiscal policy. Therefore, the literature focuses on political monetary cycles. In the 
early search for political monetary cycles - explained by electorally motivated 
incumbents as in the Nordhaus (1975) model - McCallum (1978), Beck (1984) and 
Havrilesky (1987) find no evidence for political monetary cycles, while Grier (1984) 
did find a political monetary cycle by looking at M1. The latter result is confirmed by 
Beck (1987). However, Beck (1987) argues that there could be a political cycle in M1, 
which is not created by the Fed because M1 is not under direct control of the Fed. In 
other words, M1 is an endogenous variable. He suggests to look at the instruments of 
the Fed such as the federal funds rate to find evidence for a political monetary cycle. 
In those instruments, he does not find a political cycle. Nevertheless, Grier (1989) who 
controls for GNP, interest rates and budget deficits does find a cycle in M1. The 
empirical evidence on the opportunistic political monetary cycles thus has obtained 
mixed results, so Grier (1989) concludes that the ‘case is not closed.’ A recent paper 
by Abrams and Iossifov (2006) does find a political monetary cycle in the federal 
funds rate when the president and the chairman of the Fed share the same partisan 
affiliation. 
 Although the election driven monetary cycles gave mixed results, there is more 
positive empirical evidence for the partisan theory. Chappell et al. (1993) finds that the 
presidents exerted their partisan’s influences in the Presidential appointments with the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Democrats’ appointees of the FOMC are 
less tight in monetary policy making then Republicans making the Presidential 
appointments a channel to influence their partisan affiliations. Moreover, Chappell and 
Keech (1986) find that the money growth is systematically higher under Democratic 
presidents, which means that Democrats care less about inflation. Furthermore, 
Caporale and Grier (1998) state that with Republican presidents there is significantly 
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tighter monetary policy. In accordance to Caporale and Grier (1998), Corder (2006) 
claims that with a backward-looking Taylor rule the Fed is more an inflation fighter 
with Republicans in the White House. To conclude, it seems that the President still has 
partisan influence on Fed decision-making based on previous empirical studies.  
 As a final remark we note that both Abrams and Iossifov (2006) and Corder 
(2006) test the theories of political pressure of the Fed by a Taylor rule, which will 
also be used in this paper. In a comment Tempelman (2007) argues that the time 
period (1954-2004) in the paper of Abrams and Iossifov (2006) is too long obscuring 
trends like the improvement in monetary policy over the last 30 years. We also use a 
relatively short time period (1987-2006), but unlike Corder (2006) and Abrams and 
Iossifov (2006) we use a forward-looking model.  More details on our Taylor 
specification will be given in the next section. 
 
3.    Economic model 
 
3.1  Time-varying Taylor rule  
 
To test the political monetary cycle theory and the partisan theory we use a time-
varying version of a modified Taylor rule model for Fed’s behavior. The standard rule 
from Taylor (1993) can be written as the following linear equation: 
     
                         =  + 
∗ + 	 − 
∗ + 	 − 
∗
                                           (1) 
 
Here, 	represents the nominal short term interest rate, 	is the inflation rate, ∗ is the 
equilibrium real interest rate, ∗	is the target level of the inflation rate,  is the natural 
logarithm of GDP, ∗ is the natural logarithm of potential GDP. The difference 
between the loglevel of GDP and the loglevel of potential GDP is the output gap. The 
coefficients  and  measure the reaction of the Fed when inflation and output 
deviates from the target inflation rate and potential GDP, respectively. Both  and  
are positive (Taylor, 1993 proposes  = 0.5;  = 0.5). The rational is that when the 
inflation exceeds its target or when the output gap is positive, the nominal interest rate 
has to be increased in order to reduce the inflationary pressure. If the opposite occurs 
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the rule recommends a lower nominal short term interest rate in order to stimulate 
consumption and investment.  
 Although Taylor (1993) shows that the rule describes the federal funds rate 
quite accurate in the period 1987-1992, there are some arguments why the rule might 
not accurately describe the behaviour of a central bank.  First of all, the main two 
objectives of the Fed, referred as the FOMC’s dual mandate, are full employment and 
price stability. Therefore, the output gap might be less relevant for the Fed than the 
unemployment gap. Secondly, Svensson (2003) states that even if the central bank’s 
objective is to stabilize inflation and output a simple Taylor rule will be suboptimal. 
The reason is that the impact of interest rate changes on inflation and output (or 
unemployment) comes with a lag. Therefore, Svensson (2003) argues that the value of 
the instrument has to be set consistently with the inflation target and output forecasts 
allowing the use of judgement and what he calls extra-model information. In other 
words, the central bank’s behaviour should be forward looking. Besides this 
theoretical argument there is also a practical argument, namely that actual inflation and 
the output are not known when the Fed sets its federal funds rate target. As a result, 
the rule should be based on expected inflation and output instead of the realized 
values.  
 In order to deal with the two mentioned issues in the empirical model, the 
output gap will be replaced for the unemployment gap (using Okun’s Law) and we 
substitute the realized values of the explanatory variables for the expected values. 
Despite that this rule is forward looking and includes the FOMC’s dual mandate; it 
still misses a well observed behaviour of the Fed which is commonly known as 
interest rate smoothing. Interest rate smoothing reduces the variability of interest rate 
change. Following Sack and Wieland (2000), the main reasons for interest rate 
smoothing are to avoid measurement errors in real time data of key macroeconomic 
variables, reduce uncertainty about outcomes of relevant structural parameters, and 
facilitate the forward looking expectations of agents in the market. Additional, 
Woodford (1999) claims that interest rate smoothing is one of the conditions in order 
to achieve optimal monetary policy. Although interest rate smoothing is widely 
accepted, the standard Taylor rule does not include this. One way to include interest 
rate smoothing, which is also done among others by Clarida et al. (2000) and 
Woodford (1999), is to weigh the lagged variable and the interest rate target. In 
mathematical way it can be written as a partial adjustment model: 
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 =  + 	1 − 
∗
                      (2) 

∗ =  + 	 − 
∗ + 	 − 
∗ 
                   (3) 
 
Here  is the actual federal funds rate,  is the lagged federal funds rate, and ∗	is 
the federal funds rate target based on the modified Taylor rule shown by Equation (3). 
In addition,  measures the degree of interest rate smoothing. When  is relatively 
high, the Fed tends set the new federal funds rate relatively close to the lagged federal 
funds rate and therefore the degree of interest rate smoothing is high. Moreover, the 
opposite shows that the degree of interest rate smoothing is relatively low. According 
to Rudebusch (2002) most values of  are in the range of 0.8. In addition, Kim and 
Nelson (2006) use a time-varying model also find an  around 0.8 in the period 1970-
2001. In the partial adjustment model the errors are serially correlated which biases the 
LS standard errors. So, we take a different approach instead and model policy inertia 
by applying Generalized Least Squares (GLS) with AR(1)-coefficient ρ, and time-
varying weights: 
 
 =  + 	1 −  + 	 − 
∗ − 	 − 
∗ + 
														 − 
∗  − 	 − 
∗ +                             (4) 
 
The reason for time-varying weights is that we will obtain the coefficients  and  as 
a time series, which is helpful to test the political pressure theories of Hibbs (1987) 
and Nordhaus (1975). In order to make the coefficients  and  time-varying, a state 
space model with the Kalman filter will be used. State space models mainly have two 
useful applications for macroeconomic. Firstly, it can identify unobserved variables, 
such as natural rate of unemployment or the potential level of output. Secondly, it can 
be used to make coefficients time-varying. Our state space model representation 
consists of Equation (4) above completed with: 
 
 =  + 
 																	                                                                                 (5) 
 =  + 
!
		                                                                                               (6) 
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Equation (4) represents the Fed’s interest rate policy where  is the error term, and 
where  is called the signal variable. In addition Equations (5) and (6) model  and 
 as stochastic processes with error terms   and 
!
. Different stochastic processes 
can been chosen for the state variables, we choose random walk processes without 
drift that allow for slowly evolving weights in the Taylor rule.  
The main feature of a state space model is the Kalman filter (Kalman, 1960). In 
short, the Kalman filter basically predicts the value of the future state variable ( and 
) based on the information given at the previous period t-1. After this the Kalman 
filter updates the predicted estimates when the value of the signal variable () is 
known and gives a filtered estimate of the state variables ( and ). This will be an 
iterative process until the end of the sample. After that it will give a smoothed 
estimated which are calculated on the whole information set by backward calculations, 
so it estimates the state value at time t-1 based on the information of the state and 
signal variables given at time t which is obtained by the iterative process described 
before.  Thus, most information is contained in the smoothed estimates, which will be 
used in our approach.  One additional beneficial feature of the Kalman filter is that it 
can be used with different frequencies of the data in the states variables. Therefore, the 
monthly expectations of inflation and the quarterly expectations of the unemployment 
rate can be used. 
             The inflation target of the Fed will be assumed to be 2% over the entire 
period. This assumption is in accordance with Taylor (1993). Although Fed’s inflation 
targets may vary over time due to different economic circumstances, the target of 2% 
may be the ideal value of the Fed, and therefore a reasonable assumption.  
 
3.2    Political pressure 
 
After obtaining the smoothed time series of  and  by using the Kalman filter, we 
test the political monetary cycle theory and the partisan theory. As already mentioned, 
the political monetary cycle is based the concept of an economic boost before the 
election and a recession after the election with no difference with respect to the 
partisan affiliation of the incumbent. In order to test this theory we add three election 
(0,1) dummies: an election dummy (E), a before-election dummy (B), and an after-
election dummy (A). In the next section we discuss how we construct the dummy 
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variables. Following the theory, an economic boost before the election would let the 
Fed react less to inflation and more to the unemployment gap. On the other hand, after 
the elections the Fed should be less responsive to the unemployment gap and be more 
inflation averse.  
 To test the partisan theory we construct a partisan-dummy P with the value of 1 
when a Democrat is in the office while it will be 0 when a Republican is in charge. 
The partisan theory describes that Republicans are more inflation avers while the 
Democrats care more about unemployment. These tests will reveal whether there is 
significant pressure of the incumbent on the Fed to change their behaviour toward the 
federal funds rate. However, when the Fed is completely independent from the White 
house both theories should be rejected. The equations to test these theories are: 
 
 Δ =  + #$ + % + &' + () + *
 
                                                      (7) 
 Δ = + + ,$ + - + .' + ) + *
!
                                                     (8) 
 
Following the theory, an economic boost before the election would let the Fed react 
less to inflation and more to the unemployment gap. As a result, the coefficients # 
and , should be negative. On the other hand, after the elections the Fed should be less 
response for the unemployment gap and be more inflation averse. Hence, the 
coefficients & and .	should be positive. The partisan theory describes that 
Republicans are more inflation avers while the Democrats care more about 
unemployment. Consequently, ( should be negative because Democrats are less 
inflation fighters and  should also negative because they react heavier to high 
unemployment.  
 
4.     Data 
 
We are analysing political pressure for the period August 1987 until and including 
January 2006. In this period monetary policy has been well developed and the Fed was 




Table 1. Descriptions and sources of the time series. 
Series name Description 
FFR Effective Federal Funds Rate 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
EXI Median expected price change next 12 months 
Source: Survey of the University of Michigan 
EXU Median 4-quarter ahead unemployment forecast (sequence of 5-
step-ahead forecasts including current-quarter forecasts) 
Source: Survey of professional forecasters of the Federal Bank of 
Philadelphia 
 
The definitions, samples, frequency, and sources of these series are in 
Appendix A. The effective federal funds rate is from the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. These are annualized monthly averages based on daily 
figures. The survey of the University of Michigan has been used to obtain the expected 
yearly inflation rate for every month. The expected 12 month ahead inflation rate is 
less volatile than the actual annual inflation rate as is shown in Figure 1. The quarterly 
expected unemployment rate is from a survey of professional forecasters of the 
Federal Bank of Philadelphia. Figure 2 reveals that the expected 4-quarter ahead 
forecast of unemployment underestimates the peaks and troughs in the actual 
unemployment rate. These peaks and troughs in the actual unemployment rate for the 
US correspond closely to the peaks (July 1990 and March 2001) and troughs (March 
1991 and November 2001) in the US business cycle as dated by the NBER. 
Instead of assuming a constant natural unemployment rate of for instance 6%, 
we use the Hodrick-Prescott filter because the Fed might target a different rate under 
different economic circumstances. The quarterly expected unemployment rate is 
decomposed in a monthly trend component, which we interpret as the expected natural 
rate of unemployment, and a cyclical component using a state space approach of the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter using a wider sample (July 1954 until and including June 2013) 
to avoid the end-point bias. We denote by the expected unemployment gap the 
difference between the median 4-quarter ahead forecast (EXU) and the smoothed 
monthly trend component (EXUHPF) from the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Finally, the 
target level of the inflation is set at 2% annually, and the expected inflation gap is 
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defined as the median expected price change in the next 12 months (EXI) minus 2. 
These constructed series are presented in Figure 3. 
 
 






Figure 2. The median expected 4-quarter ahead forecast of unemployment and the 
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Figure 3. The federal funds interest rate (FFR), the expected inflation rate minus the 
target inflation rate (EXI-2), and the expected unemployment rate minus the expected 






























GHW Bush Clinton GW Bush
 14
Instead of assuming a constant natural unemployment rate of for instance 6%, 
we use the Hodrick-Prescott filter because the Fed might target a different rate under 
different economic circumstances. The quarterly expected unemployment rate is 
decomposed in a monthly trend component, which we interpret as the expected natural 
rate of unemployment, and a cyclical component using a state space approach of the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter using a wider sample (July 1954 until and including June 2013) 
to avoid the end-point bias. We denote by the expected unemployment gap the 
difference between the median 4-quarter ahead forecast (EXU) and the smoothed 
monthly trend component (EXUHPF) from the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Finally, the 
target level of the inflation is set at 2% annually, and the expected inflation gap is 
defined as the median expected price change in the next 12 months (EXI) minus 2. 
The time series are illustrated in Figure 3. 
In the analysis we focus exclusively on the Greenspan era: August 1987 until 
and including January 2006. In this period there were five elections with 8 years of 
Democrats (Clinton administrations, February 1993 – January 2001) and 10.5 years of 
Republicans in the office (Reagan, February 1981-January 1989; G.H.W. Bush, 
February 1989-January 1993; and G.W. Bush, February 2001-January 2009). Figure 3 
illustrates that in the administration of G.H.W. Bush and the first administration of 
G.W. Bush the federal funds rate declined sharply. In the period 1999-2000 the 
interest rate was raised in six steps from 4.5% to 6.5%. However, over the period 
2000-2001 the stock market dropped sharply, and as a response the Fed reduces the 
federal funds rate dramatically. In addition, the Fed kept the federal funds rate 
extremely low until 2004.  
To test the political pressure hypotheses we construct dummy variables. The 
dummy variable P has a value of is 1 in the months in which the Democrats are in 
office and zeroes for Republicans. Furthermore, we constructed three (0,1) election 
dummy variables: E is 1 in the election month (November), and 0 elsewhere. B and A 
have ones in six months before, respectively after the elections, and 0 elsewhere. 
Obviously, six months is an arbitrary choice. However, we indicate below that 




5.     Results 
 
The economic model given by Equations (4), (5), and (6) is estimated using maximum 
likelihood. We impose some assumptions on the model. The signal equation (4), and 
the state equations (5) and (6) all contain an error term. We include an error term in 
the signal equation so that the weights in the Taylor rule equation do not vary a lot. 
The underlying assumption is that central bank behaviour is not expected to be very 
erratic. We also assume that the covariance between the error terms is zero.1 
Furthermore, we set the coefficients at initial values. The initial values for the 
autocorrelation coefficient ρ and nominal target interest rate c0 are set at 0.9 and 4, 
respectively. The autocorrelation coefficient is initially chosen close to the first-order 
autocorrelation coefficient of the federal funds rate. The initial value for the nominal 
target interest rate is based on an real interest rate of 2% and 2% inflation. 2 The 
specification of the error variances facilitate positive error variances.3 
Table 2 shows the initial values for the coefficients and their estimates. The 
coefficients of the interest rate equation are significant at 5%, and the estimate for the 
autocorrelation coefficient is smaller than 1 (p-value = 0.011). The initial state vector 










Figure 4 displays the time series of the smoothed time-varying coefficients of 
the expected inflation gap and the expected unemployment gap (coefficients  and 
) from August 1987 until January 2006. Figure 4 shows that signs of the coefficients 
are as expected, but the final state value of  is statistically not different from 0. It is 
also clear that the weight for the unemployment gap in the Taylor rule gradually 
                                                        
1 Allowing the covariance between the errors in the state equations to be non-
zero results in the covariance to be not significantly different from zero, but the 
results differ. 
2 The results are not very sensitive for the initial values. Only if the initial value 
for the autocorrelation coefficient is smaller than 0.25, the results differ, but the 
information criteria (Akaike and Schwarz) go up and the model is less 
informative. 
3 Different initial values do not change the results. 
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increases until the start of the G.W. Bush administration. The weight on inflation 
gradually drops until 2001 which coincides with the end of the Internet bubble.  
 
Table 2. Estimates of the state space model (August 1987-January 2006). 
Model specification: 
  =  + 	1 −  + 	 − 
∗ − 	 − 
∗ +
		 − 
∗  − 	 − 
∗ + ;	 
 =  + 
 ;  =  + 
!
 
Coefficient Initial value Estimate (se) 
 ρ 0.9 0.922 (0.031) 
 c0 4 3.532 (1.097) 
Error variances = exp(c) Initial value for c Estimate for c (se)  
 ε -1 -1.116 (0.172) 
 ε
α
 -1 -5.998 (1.976) 
 ε
β
 -1 -5.301 (3.276) 
 Final state p-value 
 α 0.023 0.918 
 β -1.469 0.020 
Observations (quarterly) 74  




Figure 4. The smoothed time-varying coefficients of the expected inflation gap and the 
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It may be informative to analyze the correlations between the federal funds 
rate, the expected unemployment gap, the expected inflation gap, the time-varying 
coefficient of the expected unemployment gap and the time-varying coefficient of the 
expected inflation gap. From Table 3 we conclude that the correlation between the 
expected inflation gap and the federal funds rate is positive, and the correlation 
between the expected unemployment gap and the federal funds rate is negative. This is 
what we expect: a higher inflation gap correlates with a higher federal funds rate, and 
a lower unemployment gap also correlates positively with federal funds rate.  
 
Table 3. Correlations between the federal funds rate (FFR), the expected 
unemployment gap (EXU-EXUHPF), the expected inflation gap (EXI-2), the time-
varying coefficient of the expected inflation gap (α), and the time-varying coefficient of 
the expected unemployment gap (β) for the period August 1987-January 2006. 
 
 FFR EXU-EXUHPF EXI-2 State α State β 
FFR  1.000     
EXU-EXUHPF -0.650  1.000    
EXI-2  0.619 -0.508  1.000   
State α  0.680 -0.179  -0.535  1.000   
State β  0.727 -0.209  -0.500  0.979  1.000 
 
Table 3 also shows that the correlation between the coefficients of the gap-
terms is strong and positive. One might expect the correlation to be negative if the 
policy consistently increases one coefficient while lowering the other. This is only 
observed for the G.W. Bush administration. Finally, the coefficients correlate 
positively with the federal funds rate. 
The model is estimated until January 2006. Figure C1 in Appendix  shows 
dynamic forecasts without using additional information about the federal funds rate, 
but with actual data on unemployment, trend unemployment and inflation gap. With 
the end-of-sample weights in the Taylor rule equation, the Taylor rule tracks the 
federal funds rate remarkably well until 2010. This forecast error is remarkably small 
since the forecast period includes the build-up of the US housing bubble, its burst, the 
ensuing credit crisis and the 2007-2009 recession in the United States. After 2010, the 
Taylor rule overestimates the federal funds rate by about 0.6%. 
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6.     Political pressure 
 
In this section we test the existence of the political monetary cycle and partisan 
affiliation for the period in which Greenspan served as Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve of the United States from August 1987 to January 2006. 





. The differences of these random walk processes are stationary 
variables which are used to test for impact of political pressure on the weights in the 
Taylor rule. We add election dummies to test for monetary cycles and a dummy for 
political affiliation of the incumbent president to test for partisan effects.  
 
Table 4. Estimates of political pressure (August 1987-January 2006). 
 
100Δ =  + #$ + % + &'
+ () + *
 
 
	100Δ = + + ,$ + - + .'
+ ) + *
!
 
Variable Coefficient  se Coefficient  se 
intercept -0.185 0.033 -0.376 0.026 
B (6 months) -0.063 0.066 -0.083 
E -0.035 0.148 0.019 0.116 
A (6 months) 0.031 0.065 -0.000 0.051 
P -0.285 0.046 -0.021 0.036 
Observations 221  221  
R-squared 0.154  0.013  
 
Table 4 shows that over the period August 1987 to January 2006 the weights in 
the Taylor rule gradually drop, this implies a stronger emphasis on reducing 
unemployment and less emphasis on reducing inflation. There is also evidence for a 
partisan effect. Under Democratic presidents the weight on the expected inflation gap 
drops considerably (-0.285), and this is statistically significant at 1% while the weight 
on expected unemployment in the Taylor rule does not depend on the political 
affiliation of the incumbent president. The dummies B and A reflect political pressure 
six months before and 6 months after the elections, respectively. Evidence for an 
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election driven monetary cycle is absent since none of the dummies is statistically 
significant at conventional  levels of significance. Using other dummies – single (0,1) 
dummies up to 12 months or dummies for different time spans – does not change this 
result.  
 
7.     Conclusion 
 
In order to test for political pressure the Fed’s reaction function is modeled for the 
period August 1987 to January 2006 by a modified time-varying Taylor rule 
specification. The coefficients of the expected inflation gap and the expected 
unemployment gap are made time-varying by using the Kalman filter in a state space 
setting.  
The main political macroeconomic theories of an election driven monetary 
cycle and the partisan affiliation theory are tested, and we found no evidence for an 
opportunistic political monetary cycle. However, we did find evidence of an effect of 
partisan affiliation of the incumbent president. We show that the Fed has been less 
inflation avers when a Democrat president is in office.  
There are some limitations of the study. First of all, the inflation target of 2% 
of the Fed may not be always representing the actual target. Secondly, there may be 
omitted variables such as financial stress indicators, which are not taken in account in 
the model explicitly. Finally, although state space models have clear advantages - 
which are stressed in this paper - there are disadvantages as well; there is a great 
variety of state space models formulations, and the outcomes may be sensitive to 
initial conditions. This flexibility is an advantage when used carefully. Another 
characteristic of state space models is that you have to have prior knowledge about the 
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Appendix A. Data: definitions and sources 
 
Table A1. Series names, definitions, samples and sources. 
 
Series name Description Sample, units and 
frequency 
Source 
FFR Effective Federal Funds Rate 1954M7-2013M6 
(Monthly; Percent; 






Data); Board of 
Governors of the 
Federal Reserve 
System 
EXI Median expected price change 








EXU Median Forecast, 4-quarter 
ahead unemployment forecast 





Percentage points;  
Seasonally 
Adjusted) 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia; 
Survey of Professional 
Forecasters 
E Election (0,1)-dummy: 1 in 
election month (November), 0 
elsewhere 
1954M7-2013M3 
B Pre-election period 
(0,1)-dummy: 1’s six months 
before elections, 0 elsewhere 
1954M7-2013M3 
A Post-election period 
(0,1)-dummy: 1’s six months 
after elections, 0 elsewhere 
1954M7-2013M3 
P (0,1)-dummy: 1 for a Democrat; 




Appendix B. Calculating trend unemployment 
 
EXU is decomposed in a growth or trend component (EXUHP) and stationary residual 
or cyclical component using the Hodrick Prescott filter which we estimate by the 
maximum likelihood using the Kalman filter. The state space formulation is 
 
 = / +                          (B1) 
/ = 2/ − /# + ,                     (B2) 
 
where /	is the trend component and the cyclical component   has mean 0. The ratio 
of variances between  and  is λ in the Hodrick Prescott filter function. We use as 
smoothing parameter λ = 129600. This is based on the frequency rule in Ravn-Uhlig 
(2002) with power=4. The variance of the residual noise term  is lower if λ is higher. 
Figure B1 shows expected unemployment (EXU) and the trend component 
from the smoothed Kalman filter (EXUHPF). The monthly cyclical component is 




Figure B1. The expected unemployment (EXU) and the trend component from the 
























90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
Federal funds rate (FFR)
Dynamic forecast of the FFR
 













List of research reports 
 
 
12001-HRM&OB: Veltrop, D.B., C.L.M. Hermes, T.J.B.M. Postma and J. de Haan, A Tale 
of Two Factions: Exploring the Relationship between Factional Faultlines and Conflict 
Management in Pension Fund Boards 
 
12002-EEF: Angelini, V. and J.O. Mierau, Social and Economic Aspects of Childhood 
Health: Evidence from Western-Europe 
 
12003-Other: Valkenhoef, G.H.M. van, T. Tervonen, E.O. de Brock and H. Hillege, Clinical 
trials information in drug development and regulation: existing systems and standards 
 
12004-EEF: Toolsema, L.A. and M.A. Allers, Welfare financing: Grant allocation and 
efficiency 
 
12005-EEF: Boonman, T.M., J.P.A.M. Jacobs and G.H. Kuper, The Global Financial Crisis 
and currency crises in Latin America 
 
12006-EEF: Kuper, G.H. and E. Sterken, Participation and Performance at the London 
2012 Olympics 
 
12007-Other: Zhao, J., G.H.M. van Valkenhoef, E.O. de Brock and H. Hillege, ADDIS: an 
automated way to do network meta-analysis 
 
12008-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Individualism and the cultural roots of management 
practices 
 
12009-EEF: Dungey, M., J.P.A.M. Jacobs, J. Tian and S. van Norden, On trend-cycle 
decomposition and data revision 
 
12010-EEF: Jong-A-Pin, R., J-E. Sturm and J. de Haan, Using real-time data to test for 
political budget cycles 
 
12011-EEF: Samarina, A., Monetary targeting and financial system characteristics: An 
empirical analysis 
 
12012-EEF: Alessie, R., V. Angelini and P. van Santen, Pension wealth and household 
savings in Europe: Evidence from SHARELIFE 
 
13001-EEF: Kuper, G.H. and M. Mulder, Cross-border infrastructure constraints, 
regulatory measures and economic integration of the Dutch – German gas market 
 
13002-EEF: Klein Goldewijk, G.M. and J.P.A.M. Jacobs, The relation between stature and 
long bone length in the Roman Empire 
 
13003-EEF: Mulder, M. and L. Schoonbeek, Decomposing changes in competition in the 
Dutch electricity market through the Residual Supply Index 
 
13004-EEF: Kuper, G.H. and M. Mulder, Cross-border constraints, institutional changes 











13005-EEF: Wiese, R., Do political or economic factors drive healthcare financing 
privatisations? Empirical evidence from OECD countries 
 
13006-EEF: Elhorst, J.P., P. Heijnen, A. Samarina and J.P.A.M. Jacobs, State transfers at 
different moments in time: A spatial probit approach 
 
13007-EEF: Mierau, J.O., The activity and lethality of militant groups: Ideology, capacity, 
and environment 
 
13008-EEF: Dijkstra, P.T., M.A. Haan and M. Mulder, The effect of industry structure and 
yardstick design on strategic behavior with yardstick competition: an experimental study 
 
13009-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Values of financial services professionals and the global 
financial crisis as a crisis of ethics 
 
13010-EEF: Boonman, T.M., Sovereign defaults, business cycles and economic growth in 
Latin America, 1870-2012 
 
13011-EEF: He, X., J.P.A.M Jacobs, G.H. Kuper and J.E. Ligthart, On the impact of the 
global financial crisis on the euro area 
 
13012-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Generational shifts in managerial values and the coming 
of a global business culture 
 
13013-EEF: Samarina, A. and J.E. Sturm, Factors leading to inflation targeting – The 
impact of adoption 
 
13014-EEF: Allers, M.A. and E. Merkus, Soft budget constraint but no moral hazard? The 
Dutch local government bailout puzzle 
 
13015-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Trust and management: Explaining cross-national 
differences in work autonomy 
 
13016-EEF: Boonman, T.M., J.P.A.M. Jacobs and G.H. Kuper, Sovereign debt crises in 
Latin America: A market pressure approach 
 
13017-GEM: Oosterhaven, J., M.C. Bouwmeester and M. Nozaki, The impact of 
production and infrastructure shocks: A non-linear input-output programming approach, 
tested on an hypothetical economy 
 
13018-EEF: Cavapozzi, D., W. Han and R. Miniaci, Alternative weighting structures for 
multidimensional poverty assessment 
 
14001-OPERA: Germs, R. and N.D. van Foreest, Optimal control of production-inventory 
systems with constant and compound poisson demand 
 
14002-EEF: Bao, T. and J. Duffy, Adaptive vs. eductive learning: Theory and evidence 
 
14003-OPERA: Syntetos, A.A. and R.H. Teunter, On the calculation of safety stocks 
 
14004-EEF: Bouwmeester, M.C., J. Oosterhaven and J.M. Rueda-Cantuche, Measuring 
the EU value added embodied in EU foreign exports by consolidating 27 national supply 











14005-OPERA: Prak, D.R.J., R.H. Teunter and J. Riezebos, Periodic review and 
continuous ordering 
 
14006-EEF: Reijnders, L.S.M., The college gender gap reversal: Insights from a life-cycle 
perspective 
 
14007-EEF: Reijnders, L.S.M., Child care subsidies with endogenous education and 
fertility 
 
14008-EEF: Otter, P.W., J.P.A.M. Jacobs and A.H.J. den Reijer, A criterion for the number 
of factors in a data-rich environment 
 
14009-EEF: Mierau, J.O. and E. Suari Andreu, Fiscal rules and government size in the 
European Union 
 
14010-EEF: Dijkstra, P.T., M.A. Haan and M. Mulder, Industry structure and collusion 
with uniform yardstick competition: theory and experiments 
 
14011-EEF: Huizingh, E. and M. Mulder, Effectiveness of regulatory interventions on firm 
behavior: a randomized field experiment with e-commerce firms 
 
14012-GEM: Bressand, A., Proving the old spell wrong: New African hydrocarbon 
producers and the ‘resource curse’ 
 
14013-EEF: Dijkstra P.T., Price leadership and unequal market sharing: Collusion in 
experimental markets 
 
14014-EEF: Angelini, V., M. Bertoni, and L. Corazzini, Unpacking the determinants of life 
satisfaction: A survey experiment 
 
14015-EEF: Heijdra, B.J., J.O. Mierau, and T. Trimborn, Stimulating annuity markets 
 
14016-GEM: Bezemer, D., M. Grydaki, and L. Zhang, Is Financial Development Bad for 
Growth? 
 
14017-EEF: De Cao, E., and C. Lutz, Sensitive survey questions: Measuring attitudes 
regarding female circumcision through a list experiment 
 
14018-EEF: De Cao, E., The height production function from birth to maturity 
 
14019-EEF: Allers, M.A., and J.B. Geertsema, The effects of local government 
amalgamation on public spending and service levels. Evidence from 15 years of municipal 
boundary reform. 
 
14020-EEF: Kuper, G.H., and J.H. Veurink, Central bank independence and political 
pressure in the Greenspan era. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
